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Introduction
In 1995 Qatar was barely on the investment map. It wasn't rated by Moody's or Fitch, and was ranked 86th globally in terms of nominal GDP output (IMF). In 1996, Moody's assigned Qatar a Ba1 rating for long-term bonds and notes, and a Ba2 for long-term bank deposits. 10 Months later both were raised to Baa2 and then again in 2002 to A3. In 2005 The Qatar investment authority was created to add value to the nation's oil revenues. Its rating also rose that year to A1, and was raised three more times over the next two years. Currently its GDP is ranked 52nd.Qatar is of course an exceptional case. Relatively few countries have never once even been reviewed for a downgrade in their status. Even Norway was lowered in 1987, although its Government Pension Fund1 wasn't founded until 1990 (and it has been a perfect Aaa since 1995/97). The rapid growth of Qatar's credit rating, and the founding of the Investment Authority, also happen to coincide with the coining of the term “Sovereign Wealth Fund” by Andrew Rozanov in a short article published by the Central Banking Journal, also in 2005. In that article (in an endnote) the financial heft of SWFs was estimated at 1Tn. USD.  The Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute evaluates those reserves currently at 5.135Tn which is also after a half trillion USD loss in 2008. The Qatari fund, by virtue of happenstance, is an idealisation of how SWFs will be treated here. Moody's ratings show a country that was on an upswing, struck at the right time and established a fund, and then made the most of the continually opening opportunities to improve its position further. The fact that this story coincides in inception and topicality with Sovereign Wealth Fund literature generally, adds just a hint of poeticism to the example.Since Rozanov, the term has nearly become a sub-discipline of international financial study in its own right drawing ever more attention. Myths cropped up and were dispelled in the space of a few years. Panic arose as commentators announced the prospect of foreign governments investing in vulnerable sectors of domestic markets for financial, but also political gain. The prospect of the Chinese and Gulf countries, symbolically America's biggest rivals, gaining dominance of capitalist markets led to a paranoid and nationalist treatment of the subject. This evolution can be tracked, to an extent, by proxy, via the evolution of regulatory regimes and the literature there on. This debate on regulation was unlike any previous; it was a debate on to what extent markets should regulate government. True to form, competitiveness and the importance of financial flows finally helped decide that the answer would be: 'very little'.
1 Despite its nominal identification as a pension fund, the Norwegian (and Russian for that matter) funds are generally 
considered to act as most other Sovereign Wealth Funds and are usually included in that category, versus for 
example the Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan – a quintessential pension fund, of the type which will not be treated 
here.
Gillette - 4This is due in part to the massive growth in the heft of Funds that followed. As a coincidence of economic history, this growth readied SWF countries to become the benefactors of the private market when in 2008 the American sub-prime mortgage crises hit, and went viral. Quickly buying up cheap blue chip equities,  with little fanfare SWFs made some of the most important Wall Street and City purchases of the time, shoring up liquidity in an otherwise overly-volatile but sinking market. Known as “uphill” investment flows – from LDC to OECD countries – the phenomenon remains theoretically and practically perplexing in many respects (Lucas, 1990, quoted in Alberola & Serena, 2008; and Das, 2008). After much debate on the extent to which Western finance was vulnerable to, dependent on, or indifferent to SWF monetary flows, there remains an important discussion about what this means for developing countries – the primary purveyors of sovereign wealth. The priorities of the debate thus far betray a subtle Eurocentrism. The discussion that must comes in its stead has to do with what SWFs mean for emerging countries. This paper therefore sets out to analyse whether this investment vehicle is useful in building an economy in a developing nation. The focus here will be on access to credit as something of a proxy measure of the acceptability of a nation in financial terms, and treats the associated reductions in the cost of development as the more literal consequence. The theoretical implications are much wider however, as it appears that the neoclassical, Marxist, world-systems theory and many other conventional conceptions of how financial flows should move are contradicted by the SWF 'uphill' phenomenon. 'Who is dependent on whom' is a subsequently valid question and commands a re-evaluation of theoretical international finance.This paper will contribute to an answer, without offering a purporting and overly-assumptive one. Instead, it will demonstrate that through contributions to domestic development via increased credit facilities, speculative defences, wealth management, increased economic stability, new economy-building faculties, and generally improved institutions, that SWFs are indeed a positive development in terms of economic construction. On the one hand SWFs propose a solution to the old problem of 'Dutch Disease', and yet are equally useful for other forms of government surplus. This implies an institutional innovation that has the potential to shift developmental paradigms. This will be the theoretical frame of the current, practical, business-oriented discussion, centred on the finding of a strong correlation between SWF inception and upward credit-rating adjustments.
Research problem
The problem at hand is one of understanding what impact Sovereign Wealth Funds have on 
Gillette - 5the business environment of a country. Generally speaking, this applies both to a country receiving funding, and one initialising a fund. The focus here however will be on the fund-initialising country, taking the stabilising effects of SWF investment in a target country into consideration with respect to the financial position of the former. More concretely one can see for example this in the intrinsic link that has now been established between Chinese investment bodies and the American economy and dollar (Santiso 2008; Overbeek, 2012).Broad brush-strokes must be used as there is obviously no way to universally characterise the investment strategies of SWFs. Norway’s Global Pension Fund is renowned for its docility and transparency, investing passively in a wide portfolio of small positions. Temasek (Singapore) on the other hand, attempted to purchase a controlling share in the Thai national communications company sparking strong opposition (Glicklich & Gandinetti, 2012). This will not however be a problem since the unit of analysis will be the home economy. Just as SWFs can act most rationally for maximising profit, they can also act most rationally for the benefit of their domestic shareholders (citizens – see Schubert, 2011), or anywhere in between these two goals. Indeed these might not form X and Y axes at all, but rather often can bee seen as synonymous names for the same metric. The regulation of SWFs does remain a variable that must be treated however. This is because it represents the way SWFs see their reflection in the markets where they invest. The geopolitics of finance are unequivocally different in a world where self- and convention-regulated SWFs are accepted within the normal plurality of financial actors, without precondition, than one where they are limited to non-voting shares or “non-essential” industries (Das, 2008; O'Brien, 2008; Sornorajah, 2011; Glicklich & Grandinetti, 2012). That said, of their own accord, whether or not for the purposes of staving off the prospect of regulation or not, Dubai Ports world (not directly an SWF) and the China Investment Corporation (CIC), have expressed a willingness to take non-voting shares (Curzovic, 2012, p. 92). Others may feel similarly. Currently, because of SWFs, we are seeing what is essentially the first time non-OECD countries hold sway over their more developed economic partners (Beck & Fidora, 2009). This is why the terms of discussion are so important; the theoretical implications could be enormous. If indeed SWFs succeed in presenting a new-found financial and subsequently industrial (although that remains more to be seen) avenue of “catching up” (Gerschenkron, 1962; Abramovich, 1986; Broadberry, 1997), a decisive chapter in the reversal of global power structures, per finance, could be written. For perspective, China, the most important developing nation, has, including Hong Kong (although not the Republic of China), a total of five SWFs currently in operation valued collectively at 1.48 trillion USD (SWF Institute). The China Investment Corporation in 2010 held at 
Gillette - 6least 9.63Bn USD in American stocks in 2010, while the other major Chinese fund, the SAFE Investment Company holds currently at least 6Bn USD in UK equities (McMahon, 2010; SWF Institute). Overall, over 40% of SWF assets are estimated to be in the US (Alberola & Serena).
Reconstruction and Graining Ground
This is the new context, and it has its roots in the 2008 financial crisis. Emerging market country SWFs became one of the few stable options from where some parts of the developed world could draw funds to cushion themselves, their plummeting stock markets, and the solvency of the pillars of their banking and finance sectors. Reconciling vulnerability to collapse and vulnerability to foreign governments gave way to a compromise when SWFs shored up major financial institutions, generally without taking overly-aggressive stances. Some of those moves included:
 Abu Dhabi – 7.5Bn to Citi 
 China (CIC) – Mogran stanley
 Singapore (GIC) – UBS
 Temasek – 5Bn to Merril Lynch
 Qatar – increased stake in Barclays and Credit Suisse 
 Libya – secured Fortis (Belgium)
(Preston, 2010)As a trend of self-imposed benevolence continued to develop, SWFs gained further credibility and market access. Looking back as early as 2010, the misplacement of previous fears was begging to reshape that era of the debate. Sinophobia in the US along with residual resentments in the popular psyche of America after 9/11 towards the gulf were brought into the spotlight. The irrationality of such sentiments is highlighted by authors such as Norton (2010, p. 649) in that political motivations have thus far been either aligned or subordinate to economic ones. Nonetheless, as Kellerhals (2008) notes, they are “about as transparent as a brick wall”. In the years following 2008 however, SWFs made a visibly concerted effort to work alongside the international community, i.e. the G20, IMF, OECD, in increasing their political palatability in the West (Ervin, 2008; Ruggiero, 2008). 
Gillette - 7There are a few reasons why Western countries have warmed to the idea of SWF investment aside from crisis-imposed desperation. As non-flighty investors, they can act as the proverbial cold water during speculative attacks. In having a tendency to speculate up long-term, rather than down, they can offset ‘hot money flows’. They also stabilise the local currency by holding and adding value to foreign exchange. At home, they contribute to stabilising macroeconomics by improving borrowing conditions. They do not have to provide these funds themselves, although they do invest significant amounts domestically. it seems that the international financial community responds positively to the more sobre investment strategies of SWFs to begin with, and rewards host countries with better access to cheaper loans - a boon for the large and growing entrepreneurial classes of BRIC and other developing nations. This in addition to the knowledge transfers that can occur through the umbrella of SWFs and their components, which is potentially a very positive situation for economic development particularly from an industrialisation point of view.
The question at hand
According to Aizenman & Glick (2009), if a country experiences a ten per cent rise in a current account surplus, it is eight per cent more likely to open a fund. Having a high surplus versus GDP seems to be a characteristic of a disproportional amount of fund starters. Fund inception also goes up by three per cent if fuel exports go up ten per cent versus all exports.  Ultimately though how far can SWFs take a country? Can sovereign wealth funds play a rôle in reversing the “financial globalisation trap” - the financial exclusion of poor countries (Hellenier et 
al., 2010)? They seem to reflect well on a nation as SWF investment-receiving economies seem increasingly more willing to deal with countries starting funds. This is shown by ratings data and can be explained in part by other findings of Aizenman & Glick such as the fact that SWF country governments tend to more effective and less corrupt. Governance seems to be going up as well, which further encourages interaction with funds. This is because as more funds enter the arena, competition necessarily increases. Funds either need to make themselves more appealing with more transparency, or seek out new geographies to invest in. As 2011 was the biggest year for fund creation (six new funds), the field is thickening quickly. Both of these developments are likely beneficial for LDCs as well. 
Market competitiveness is a particularly promising avenue for explaining how LDCs can overcome backwardness. Although over time, SWF countries appear to hold fewer non-invested 
Gillette - 8reserves (Aizenman & Glick), their handling of funds appears to nonetheless discourage currency speculation against an SWF country (Alberola & Serena, 2008). Overall, Obstfeld et al. (2010) observe a long-term trend in greater foreign exchange reserve holdings. Asia has over 50 per cent of the world's foreign exchange reserves currently, and 30 percent is in China alone (Alberola & Serena, 2008). SWFs have not shown the need to act as lenders of last resort at home, although there is no reason to believe they would not as they have been more than happy to do so abroad in the public and private sectors. Furthermore, they increase the return on foreign exchange holdings, this is the explicit mandate of China's CIC (Monk, 2009).  These larger reserve funds can then support a country's currency in the case of major damage to an industry on which a country is overly dependent. Obstfeld quotes Keynes (1971) discussing the reserve requirements of the Indian government in light of the vulnerability of jute and wheat (p. 62). SWFs contribute to overall economic diversification as well, hedging twofold the currency risks present in underdeveloped economies. Infant industries also benefit from the increased currency management capacities that countries can gain from SWFs (Alberola & Serena; Overbeek, 2012). This sort of counter-cyclical “reserve recylcling” has been especially useful for China because of its US treasury and stock market investments, and oil countries that can prevent rising commodity prices from inflating their currencies.
To what extent should markets regulate governments?
The regulatory question must subsequently be asked, since this is where SWF investment levels might run into bottlenecks. Two major factors play into the regulatory question. The first is to what extent SWF funding can stabilise recipient economies? Related, is how great the threat of SWFs moving funding to fellow LDCs if regulatory burdens become too great in OECD economies? The answers are somewhat tautological in that the fact that strict regulations have not been put in place would suggest deficit economies are happy to have SWF investment, and that they understand there is a real threat that they will happily invest domestically and in other emerging markets. China for example has an entire fund (albeit it’s smallest at 5Bn) dedicated to African investment and development (SWF Institute).  Meanwhile, Kuwait has taken large stakes in the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, while Qatar and the Emirates' funds have put large amounts of funds into Africa (especially the Maghreb) (Santiso 2008). The question of just how much SWFs would bring to hungry developing markets would only be answered if OECD markets chased them away, which they don't seem likely to do (Monk, 2009). 
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As investments in large OECD banks demonstrate, SWFs do prefer large targets that can be trusted to carry value over a long period of time, something more scarce in volatile emerging markets. Without an impetus to do so, it seems unlikely such a shift would occur. That does however put major Western markets in a difficult position though. Cash is needed because of large deficits, and yet there are political liabilities to selling debt to what critics perceive as shady buyers. The choice, essentially, becomes between keeping investments by deregulating towards foreign public investors, or releasing a large volatility into international finance as SWFs go elsewhere.Another tangental but not unrelated question is to do with governance. Aizenman and Glick (2009) showed through statistical analysis, that while developing countries with SWFs tend to have lower governance standards than developed countries, they also have higher standards than other developing countries. This is important for two related reasons. The first of these is that SWFs make a good case for having positive governance spillovers in the financial management classes of a country. Secondly, this could potentially lead to further growth in this respect, a positive eventuality that developing nations could foster through strategic engagement with SWFs. Essentially what this means is that countries that found SWFs tend to be doing a bit better, and these investment-attractive attributes become amplified by the foundation of a fund.
Why ratings matter
This catalytic effect should not be surprising. In order to be competitive in international markets, SWFs cannot be bogged down by the kind of inefficiencies that government bodies are typically detracted from for. Consistent with Aizenman & Glick, the current suggestion, and expectation, Biglaiser et al. 2008, found in statistically comparing changes in sovereign bond ratings and investment flows over a 15-year period, that increases in credit ratings could be generally equated with increased capital investment flows. Further consistent was their findings that democracy, especially in more developed LDC (i.e. BRICS and similar countries, who tend also to be SWF countries or candidates), was not a particularly relevant factor for investors. Instead, FDI depended more on regime and economic stability – often emblematised by improving credit ratings. This begs the important question addressed by Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007) of whether ratings reflect the current state of affairs, or provide new information. The findings favour the 
Gillette - 10latter and suggest that traders can act on ratings changes. Whether this can be seen as an adjustment from a de facto to a de jure analysis of the market on the part of traders is relatively irrelevant in the current context, since ratings do lead to a change in the behaviour of investors in both bond and stock markets.Furthermore, according the the African Research Bulletin (2007) “the key to borrowing at reasonable rates on the international bond market is a country's sovereign credit rating...A high rating implies less risk, so a lower rate of interest” (p.  17432). This is reinforced in a more general context by Afonso et al. (2010) who write: “sovereign ratings are a key determinant of the interest rates a country faces in the international financial market and, therefore, of its borrowing costs” (p. 1). Obviously, this is good for the development of any state, but particularly the ambitions of a developmental state. What this means is that on the road to being a good SWF candidates, countries also become good investment candidates. After starting a fund, ratings agencies signal to investors that this country is indeed a more worthwhile investment, reinforcing those positive internal developments. Afonso et al. use a pre-determined set of basic national indicators such as GDP per capita, real GDP growth, government effectiveness and foreign reserves to predict within one notch up to 75% of ratings, indicating a strong link between ratings and basic fundamental indicators. Mellios & Paget-Blanc (2006) took efforts to explain sovereign ratings by correlating 13 fundamental variables, of economic and political character of which nine were retained. Some included per-capita income, government income, real exchange rate and inflation which were also found to be able to predict ratings. It is not surprising then that all of these can be positively influenced, actively, through SWFs. Similar results were found by Butler and Fauver (2008) looking at the correlation between stronger political and legal institutions and sovereign ratings. A rise in a rating in a developing nation would thus indicate an associated rise in factors with positive proxy effects on that economy (or that result from them) in various other economic, political, and legal fields that have strong implications for attracting international finance and getting better interest rates for domestic businesses. 
Ratings agencies are detracted from for their influence in international finance, and occasionally bias towards the West/OECD. Furthermore there is something of a conflict of interests in terms of the bias of ratings due to the fact that they are paid for by companies who are rated, and that the top three all come from the US (Lu & Yanyan, 2012). This in part explains the more recent credence given to Dagong, a Chinese ratings agency. Such an extension is not however required in the current context, and typical criticisms of ratings agencies in development in fact strengthen the case for SWFs as a developmental tool. 
Gillette - 11Further to the point, Giselle Datz (2004) makes the case that ratings reinforce an OECD-centric view of finance and play a rôle in charging countries more for weaker participation in Washington-Consensus style reforms by implying an association of 'risk' with deviation from prescribed fiscal-political governance. In 1993, the Economist wrote that the aggressiveness with which a country such as Mexico or Venezuela was pursuing reforms, but also things like foreign currency debt, were key determinant of their rating (remembering the Washington Consensus was more influential in 1993).Valid criticisms thus exist regarding the ratings regime. It is because of these reasons however that SWFs are all the more valid in terms of developmental innovation. SWFs can help boost a country's rating by means other than traditional neo-liberal reforms. Furthermore it means that these countries are now the investors who may or may not decide to heed the warnings of credit ratings elsewhere. When the US was downgraded for example that could be leveraged by an SWF for a higher return in theory2.  Since ratings are a measure of “a government's ability to make timely payment of the principal and interests...of its debt” (Mellios & Paget-Blanc), SWFs allow a country to be seen as a creditor rather than a debtor, putting the onus of such responsibilities on OECD countries and firms. Thus the findings here should not surprise. The game has not changed, but those who formerly were not equipped to play, are using SWFs to become important participants. They should stay as such as long as they are not regulated out of contention – which would be contradictory to neo-liberal ideology and deprive OECD countries in crisis of important liquidity.An association between ratings increases and SWFs thus further ties a link between these positive economic conditions, lower interest rates, increased investment, and active public wealth management. In short, ratings are important because they will be associated with these multi-faceted institutional signals of a ripe investment. SWFs have been associated with both developing the institutions here tied to ratings, and in this paper are strongly associated with the ratings themselves, thus complimenting previous ratings literature, while also adding robustness to the current study.
The State of the Art
The discourse around Sovereign Wealth Funds has changed over the past four years. We have seen in the space between 2005 and today a concerted shift from rhetoric to engaged discussion and analysis. Part of that has been a myriad of attempts to define the term. For the 
2 No data could be found on whether or not this was the case, and it is not expected it would be given that many such 
large deals are privately negociated.
Gillette - 12present purposes we will use Monk (2009). Monk engages purposefully with the history and interests of SWFs, maintaining an element of future uncertainty while minimising the importance of national interests. For these reasons his will be treated as the most adequate to-date definition:
“SWFs are government-owned and controlled (directly or indirectly) investment funds that have no outside beneficiaries or liabilities (beyond the government or the citizenry in abstract) and that invest their assets, either in the short or long term, according to the interests and objectives of the sovereign sponsor.” (p. 456)
Changing trends: discourse and investment
Despite ongoing rhetorical hesitations about SWF intentions, the reality that historically there has not been any precedent for financially de-stabilising, politically-motivated manoevres is important to emphasise, in contrast to other more traditional market actors (Knill et al., 2012; Monk, 2009; O’Brien 2008; Schubert, 2011; Sornorajah, 2011).  This amounts to a  self-imposed de-politicisation. The phenomenon has strategic explanations: there would be no incentive economically for activist SWFs. Funds' acceptability and market legitimacy seems to stem largely from their responsible handling of national pension, exchange and and resource money. There is also pressure from within the SWF community because they do not want to suffer restrictions brought on by another fund. Stringent nation- or economic community-level regulation would necessarily affect all Funds, and therefore a certain mutual understanding prevails (Ervin, OECD, 2008).  
2008 was a turning point in SWF framing. Prior to that point, much of the dialogue discussed the soft political power and national security threats posed by state-owned investment bodies (O’Brien 2008). Monk (2009), notes that in a poll, 66% of Americans thought that foreign government investment in private firms posed a national security threat. Early regulatory plans began developing alongside the IMF and World Bank in 2007 (Norton, 2010). Henry Paulson believed at the time that markets should be open to SWFs as long as they didin't act politically though (ibid). The bargaining position of the US rapidly deteriorated however as its financial infrastructure became more and more dependent on SWF injections. From there forward the empirically observed marketplace benevolence of SWFs became more visible, in part because their market share grew and in part because there was little option. Now more important than private 
Gillette - 13equity or hedge funds, fears of financial terrorism, luckily, simultaneously dissipated (Aizenman & Glick, 2009). SWFs kept US and other OECD markets on life-support, despite the crippling effects that investment flows had had in recent memory on many of the countries now pouring billions into struggling Western institutions.
Two story lines are important here. The first has to do with this shift in the popular treatment of SWFs and the gradual cooling of rhetoric. The second, not unrelated, pertains to an unprecedented shift in global financial dependency - “uphill investment” moving contrary to most theory, from “poor” countries to rich ones (Das, 2008). SWF cash flows in the 2008 crash were in the case of some Asian countries directly the result of their own financial panics ten years earlier. Park (2011), proposes that the memory of the currency devaluations in Asia in 1997 played strongly in favour of Funds’ usage there. Maintaining large trade balances and surpluses became the norm in trying to avoid speculative punishment. Furthermore, pools of forex could be used to maintain favourable terms of trade; an innovative, currency market-based mechanism whereby export-oriented growth would be prolonged to protect industries as they progressed through later industrial developmental stages. Park also reminds that the East Asia’s share of the world's exchange reserves had gone from 24.4 per cent in 1990 to 50.2 per cent by 2008. SWFs were a viable way for this stock to be controlled at an optimal level such that inflation did not become a domestic issue, yet maintaining liquidity so as to ward off speculators. Even in places like the Gulf where there was no history of financial crises, the same benefits apply, and have been accrued since the first SWF there in 1953 (in Kuwait). 
Economically, funds increasing reserves through SWF investments in low-selling Western shares is highly prudent. Politically at home, it can be equally beneficial from a developmental perspective, increasing the wealth of the country and its citizens directly through the fund and by proxy benefits such as better credit facilities for new businesses. In contrast however, Funds seem to acquire legitimacy in the West not through an economic track record, but through transparency and best practices (O'Brien, 2008; Ruggiero, 2008; Kotter & Lel, 2011; Glicklich & Grandinetti, 2012). Legitimacy in OECD markets appears to be more an effect than a cause of a greater SWF presence there. Full disclosure of fund activity will be difficult to achieve, and the end-game of some funds is impossible to say with certainty (although not to much of a greater extent than other market actors). As already stated, the bargaining position of most Western countries vis-à-
vis fund investment was quite weak in 2008. This is one reasons the self-regulated/Santiago principles path (non-binding best-practises) seems to currently be the dominant regulatory 
Gillette - 14regime (Norton, 2010; Park, 2011). And yet fund transparency is improving, mostly, it seems, because transparent funds make more money, especially since 75 per cent of SWF investment is trans-national (Kotter & Lel, 2011). One reason for this could be thickening of the SWF crowd, and the need to stand out in, a new element of intra-fund competitiveness thus seems to be appearing.Parallels to more traditional capitalist entities can thus be seen emerging. Thus, Sornorajah (2011) proposes that SWFs are and should be treated as any other commercial entity. Increasingly this appears to be the accepted view. He further notes that the dependence of Europe and the US during their crises on SWF and BRIC money may factor into this, especially given that no hint of non-financial/nefarious investment surfaced while the OECD was at its most vulnerable. 
As the SWF political/economic ambiguity question is resolved in favour of the latter, the door becomes open to analysis of their financial success, further normalising the SWF dialogue. Knill et al. (2012) reassesses the view that SWF strategies provide a better return on risk than other investors. The hit in return, they find, is disproportionately strong given the risk that remains present in their investment strategies. They fall therefore on the risk-tolerant side of (for example) pension funds, but the risk-averse side of hedge funds, further developing the space they seem content to occupy in asset allocation. This sort of sobering analysis appears to be the current direction of SWF literature. It compliments well the second paradigmatic shift in investment trends, normalising what stands to be a strong developmental force for SWF countries, and thus, the next logical question is to what extent SWFs can be effective at this economic developmental task. This paper will help answer that question, but leaves open to further study how this positive effect can be maximised (i.e. whether or not, there an optimal time at which a developing nation can start a fund, and if so, when?). 
Framework & Theory
Establishing how to treat the unit of analysis in much of sovereign wealth fund literature can be difficult as differing analytical frameworks can have a tendency to push them based on nominal characteristics towards the predetermined preferences of that theory. Geopolitical analyses seem to have been prominent thus far, implicitly analysing SWFs as agents of a state. This has been counter-productive to an extent and posed problems in normalising SWF activities. The historical shifts in popular treatment have dealt with this partially, mostly based on empirical evidence reinforcing the financial motivation of funds. Purely theoretical analyses have been scarce.
Gillette - 15To an extent, world systems literature and dependency theory can be applied, but mostly because SWFs break most of the predictions of these theories. Preston (2010) looks at the change in global balances of power that could have been produced from SWF investments in failing OECD economies in 2008. In acting as a new lender of last resort where the IMF has very apparently failed in that rôle in past decades, SWFs were able to assert themselves as important global players, despite the necessary damage the crisis caused to their own portfolios. World Systems though, does not break with the state-centrism composing much of Sovereign Wealth Fund literature. This should not be surprising. SWF literature appears to be creating a space contrary to the path dependencies of World Systems, and yet reinforces the primacy of the state, contrary to other alternative theories. Dixon and Monk (2012) respond to Susan Strange’s (1994) assessment that financial and economic globalisation necessarily entails an element of reduction in state sovereignty. States, they propose have found a venue to alter the form of markets without becoming directly involved. It allows states to take advantage of the trans-national characteristics of modern production. They therefore compose an important state-led element within the deterritorialising nature of finance, and bring state objectives into finance by reconciling developmental and financial interests.
This is why the “politics or finance” dichotomy has not been adequately resolved in favour of either. Sovereign wealth funds accomplish one by way of the other. As Das (2008 framed the question; do they seek the “maximisation of their share values”, or “pursue a myriad of other non-economic objectives” (p. 86). The answer appears to be 'both'. That said, the legitimacy of SWFs has been hinged by popular discussion, on whether or not they seek to maximise profits. Although this is a particularly narrow legitimacy based on the interests of Western actors allowing SWF investment in their markets. Nonetheless this seems acceptable to Funds for the most part, in the same way Western nations have come to terms with the reality that they will not have full access to Funds' financials at the global level. The Santiago principles are the emblematic resolution to this question, in the name of the status quo.
The most decisive break is perhaps with neo-classical analysis. Lucas' term “uphill investment” (which pre-dates the SWF debate by 15 years) (Das, 2008), is important because it deals with SWFs from within a financial infrastructure where states as actors, rather than finance as a tool of states or apart from states. Geopolitical games in non-financial spheres are therefore dissociated from SWF intentions and therefore from state actions as the market drives and reacts, as opposed to exclusively reacting. The implications are vastly important in terms of developing a suitable regulatory regime. If capitalist markets are to maintain their own liberal-economic 
Gillette - 16legitimacy, markets must remain open (nominally, see Chang, 2010), and yet markets only allocate resources efficiently with rational actors. Regulation in the case of SWFs thus is either an admission of divergent state and allocation goals, or a corruption of the market mechanism. The discussion of whether or not that carries the precondition of markets being left open only to objectives of profit maximisation, has become a little-discussed subtext of the SWF debate. This would be where SWFs have important theoretical implications, although thus far they have been treated in fairly practical terms. Whether a liberal market can be conditioned in such a way becomes an increasingly complex question the more elaborate the SWF debate becomes, and eventually will likely need an answer. Regulations to date have been limited in this regard but do exist. Examples include the US treasury taking action in 2007 (Ruggiero, 2008), and the G20 acting in tandem with the IMF (Hellenier et al. 2010) . The legitimacy of this action, of a government caretaking the rules of market participation versus the legitimacy of the regulated actor’s actions contrary to the geopolitical reasons for that regulation, remains in the realm of the hypothetical for the time being, but stands therefore as a possible avenue for further theoretical exploration. Because of the quelling of geopolitically motivated fears with more recent studies, and the momentary pertinence of it, this paper analyses SWFs legitimacy from a global economic and developmental economic perspective. Global market stability and an increased bargaining position for emerging economic actors make strong cases for allowing SWF investment for the sake of the robustness of globalised markets. In helping emerging markets harness what would traditionally have meant the presence of extractive institutions for primary commodities (Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, 2002) ,for contrary reasons (mining the value-adding institutions of developed nations) they can justify their own existence from a developmental perspective. The development paradigm is also important because of the very nature of SWF investment which means a stark break from the predicted investment patterns of neoclassical and marxist/imperialist theory. The “uphill” nature of investment from developing countries to the developed world has significant implications theoretically for this reason (Alberola and Serena, 2008; Das, 2008; Lucas, 1990). This trend has reached the point where, in line with the stability-themed arguments found elsewhere in this paper, the global financial structure has become increasingly used to SWF flows. As these emerging markets seek to make use of excess reserves at the same time industrial countries seek to fund deficit spending, a tenuous arrangement has emerged whereby the US dollar is propped up on the strength of its economy, in turn dependent on SWF inflows (Alberola and Serena, 2008). The fact that the deficit and (many) SWF reserves are inversely linked to global energy prices further reinforces this situation (Ibid.).Some authors such as Schubert (2011) feel that SWFs could have a mandate to invest in public benefit projects such as theatres, health care, ports, infrastructure etc. even (in rare cases) if 
Gillette - 17they will run at a deficit. This is a clear case of developmental legitimacy. The argument goes that while the return would be negative according to traditional, financial accounting, given the potential to raise standard of living and develop human capital inputs, that overall the investment is justified in the name of the citizen-owners. But is that where SWFs stand to gain further legitimacy? A similar example is found in Overbeek (2012) who explains that the China Investment Corporation (CIC) is itself legitimised, and helps legitimise the ruling communist party by virtue of its economic success (p. 154). The difference of course is in the direct inputs sent back to the community. Schubert proposes that a potential test for whether or not local investments would be appropriate for an SWF would be to establish how many other local bodies could take on that project. In the case of China, the Communist government would have no issue taking up these projects, and so according to Schubert's metric this type of investment would not make sense, and yet the legitimacy structure is very similar overall. 
Institutional perspectives also seem a natural research point of view. In the developmental tradition, SWF’s provide countries with a centrally-driven, but also market-mobilised venue through which internationally viable economic constructions can be achieved. Gerschenkron (1962) analysed the use of banking by the Prussian, French, and Russian governments to support the rapid accession of dominant industrial businesses during their pre-war period of growth. As the theory goes, innovation is key at each new round of institutional development (factor substitution). Schwartz (2012) highlights several advantages from a state structural perspective that have emerged from SWFs. Firstly they allow for control on rentier capitalist entities. By having a large investment body not limited because of their asymmetrical advantages domestically, they allow for control of capitalist rentier groups. Where an alternative is present, competition drivers necessarily offset the monopolistic advantages that large MNCs can exert on a country’s burgeoning business sector. Xu (2009) also analyses SWFs from the sovereignty perspective but moves beyond this discussion to highligh more the structural changes that they can exert on international finance, based on the evolving relationship between “rule-makers” and “rule-takers”. In this sense sovereignty and the unit of the state is not the final element, but is seen as an actor in the construction of norms and supra-national institutions that favour them once again. Furthermore, Aizenman and Glick (2009) found that countries starting SWFs generally had better governance ratings than other developing nations. While they were not at the level of industrial countries, SWF countries scored particularly well on “Government Effectiveness” and “Regulatory Quality”. SWF governments scored the lowest (lower than other developing countries) in “Voice and Accountability”. This reinforces other literature on so-called developmental coalition 
Gillette - 18(or non-coalition) governments that has been eager to disassociate the concepts of growth, economic, and developmental governance from democratic governance3. That said, newer countries to the field of SWFs have increasingly been demonstrating more accountability and transparency with their funds, given the increasing competitiveness of the SWF field. 
Elite theory is to a point tied to this last framework by Schwartz as well. He proposes looking at Temasek in Singapore from the point of view of a concerted government effort to build a strong ethnically friendly business class to offset the power of other financially successful groups and marginalise their influence in government and the national economy. The PAP then to these ends was able not only to assert their own domestic economic importance by favouring local development, but also controlled and prevent cartelisation by an economic class. To this extent they then played a key part in a “strong party” model. 
Methodology
Data for looking at the response of finance to Sovereign Wealth Funds was gathered with respect to shift in sovereign credit ratings of countries founding SWFs. Moody’s ratings of countries who have started an SWF after 1990 were looked at for changes in the period following or immediately prior to the foundation of an SWF. Moody’s was chosen because their records exist in a publicly accessible historicised format. Fitch, though not as comprehensive, was used as a supplement where Moody’s ratings were not obtainable. Generally speaking there was little divergence in the macro-level analyses of the two firms, and there is still less on aggregate with Standard & Poor’s. S&P was not used because of difficulties in obtaining relevant historical data although their ratings are generally very comparable (Cantor and Packer, 1996, cited only a handful of ratings that were different by more than one notch).
This data has been supplemented by commentary from ratings agencies with respect to the qualitative reasons they make decisions when Sovereign Wealth Funds are implicated. There were problems in accessing this in bulk however due to the fact that a free Moody’s account allows for access to very few reports. A list of reports that would be pertinent is included in annex (A), and excerpts from the previews have been used very sparingly where ambiguity is at a minimum. The 22-year time period was also meant to capture the relationship across broad changes in the global economy and various trends in finance. given that the term “Sovereign Wealth Fund” did not exist 
3 For example : Chang, 2002; Abegaz 2011; Vaughan & Gebremichael, 2011
Gillette - 19until 2005, and that the initial hype has already decreased significantly, there should be some level of temperance to emerging trends provided they are consistent. Going further back was not feasible given that many of the countries involved were not rated. The rôle and impact of SWFs, or various investment authorities or heritage funds as they were known previously, was also less clear as few existed at the time.
This methodology was chosen as a way of looking at the crossroads between international finance, geopolitics, and sovereign wealth funds themselves. Sovereign credit ratings assess the likelihood of repayment on particular credit products in a country and so are a decent proxy for the business acceptability of that country. World Bank business info was considered, although in many cases did not extend far enough back historically to be relevant. Furthermore many World Bank indicators have to do with very specific measures that can be more dependent on a single or a few pieces of legislation unrelated to SWF movement. Examples include number of days to start a business, ease of paying taxes, and ease of getting property. A question of cause and effect was then posed: If the business environment and governance stands improve more widely, these are sure to be beneficiaries, but they do no represent development, or the actual growth of money controlled by that country or its businesses. While very general, the fact that sovereign credit changes were explicitly related, at least in some cases, to SWF foundation, and on aggregate had such a strong correlation, means that the marketability of these countries can be tied to both factors. Finally, whereas ratings agencies face a potential conflict of interests with private businesses, these are less so with sovereign states, and so the increased level of detachment helps increase the nominal usefulness of the measure.The usefulness of sovereign ratings extends also to the fact that they can be reactive to “fundamentals”, institutional development, and investor sentiment, without requiring a distinction. This allows for the exploration of business/economic development in a country without becoming ideologically tied to one of these camps, and allows for broad theoretical considerations. This position (or avoidance thereof) is justified by the existence of all three frameworks in SWF literature. Das (2008), highlights the divergence between institutional governance and democratic institutions, and why SWFs contribute to development through the former category but not necessarily the latter. Schwartz (2012) focuses on political institutional manipulation and how a more favourable political settlement can be fostered through SWF resource allocation. This follows Schwartz's previous work (2009) that explores the implications of market institutions within the state on development given the historical tendencies of global economics. The theoretical framework of this paper then allows for a conscious manipulation of 
Gillette - 20these forces on the part of states, although Schwartz's previous work does imply a more traditional distribution of capital that remains at odds with SWF activity empirically. SWFs equally though are treated from a strictly market perspective (Blackrock, 2012). In such analysis, suggestions pertaining to SWF investment from a strictly profit-oriented perspective can be permitted. Several time-scales can also be applied although Blackrock uses a more short- to medium-term one. As this is clearly one objective of SWFs (profit), a discussion of their effectiveness in terms of development, would be incomplete should this not be treated. A view to credit ratings allows for walking the proverbial tightrope where manipulable investment strategies are fully relevant, and impact the developmental prospects of a fund only in terms of its post-hoc success. Given the short-term association of ratings changes found, this lends the current methodology the advantage of avoiding a discussion of differing levels of long-term success (and therefore of differing SWF types or compositions), and keeps the empirical results very close to the theoretical discussion or developmental applications of funds more generally.
Findings
The results of placing post-1990 sovereign wealth funds next to Moody’s sovereign ratings are striking. This exercise has been included in annex. It is clear even from first glance that the association between SWF inception and changes in ratings is almost entirely net positive. In 93 per cent of cases where there was a definitive change in a rating (as opposed to an adjustment of outlook), that change was positive, and there are strong mitigating factors in the 7 per cent (2 countries) where negative net changes occurred. These findings suggest a link may exist, between fiscal responsibility, or viability, and the use of sovereign wealth management to that effect. Supplemented by other literature, and the qualitative findings from ratings agency reports, it suggests furthermore an input and consequential causal relationship. To be more precise, it means that positive steps were taken in the lead up to what seems a potentially tied outcome (a ratings boost and an SWF), and that there are likely to be several benefits accrued. This is the reasoning for the use of the language “catalytic” to describe the effects of SWFs.
Some elaboration is due on the two exceptional cases. This 7 per cent represents countries that founded funds but shortly thereafter saw a fall in their ratings. From 1990 onwards, only twice has a nation seen a net ratings downgrade in the two years following the inception of an SWF. Furthermore, these two should be further qualified. The first is Italy. Italy’s fund valued at 
Gillette - 211.4Bn USD (SWF Institute) was founded in 2011 in the midst of their (ongoing) troubles with immense sovereign debt and very publicised deficits and repayment problems. That same year Italy was reviewed for downgrade and then downgraded from Aa2 to A2. How much difference such a small fund could have made is questionable in Italy’s circumstances.The other instance of a marked downgrade came in 1998 and 1999 in Venezuela. Again the size of the oil-based fund was small at 0.8Bn USD (currently, SWF Institute, size at inception was not lsited). Importantly though, that was also the same year Hugo Chavez was elected president of the country on a pro-nationalisation platform, supported by the country’s socialist and communist factions, rife with anti-capitalist rhetoric that surely scared investors away from investing there. With the threat of nationalisation hanging over leading industries, the likelihood of repayment would have necessarily gone down and thus ratings would naturally be downgraded as well. In more recent years the country’s rating has begun to recover although again the impact of the fund is likely fairly negligible.  
Reports by Moody's can help lend credence to the positive association implied by the stronger body of evidence. Upon research into what reports are publicly available from Moody’s (although there are unfortunately few), it appears that it is not merely a case of co-ocurrence. Moody’s specifically references the ability of SWFs to responsibly manage funds (Papua New Guinea, 2012/03/09). This is reinforced by the statistical findings of Aizenman and Glick that SWFs are often instituted in developing countries as governance improves, and that on the whole they are associated with more efficient economic management in the non-industrialised worldOn 23 October of this year, Fitch discussed the implications of Angola’s SWFs launch. It declared that the move was largely positive for the Angolan economy and would likely result in improved growth (Fitch, 2012/10/23). Moody’s had several similar assessment statements (2010/07/15; 2010/05/19). The transparency of the fund was noted, but it is collateral advantages such as investment in infrastructure, supplemented by knowledge gained from investments in foreign infrastructure, that the agency seemed to find particularly well-reflective of the move. Similar statements were made in regards to Papua New Guinea, where the establishment of an SWF to manage revenues and the resolution of factional conflicts proposes a trend towards greater stability (Moody’s 2012/08/13).  On Azerbaijan, Moody's wrote that the SWF has managed funds well and that “The second driver underlying today's rating action is the strong performance of Azerbaijan's non-oil sector, which has benefited from the boom in oil revenues. High government spending on upgrading Azerbaijan's infrastructure and developing new industries helped non-oil sector output expand by 9.4% last year, up from 7.9% in 2010.” (Moody's 2012/04/19) They furthermore reinforce theoretical findings in terms of developmental 
Gillette - 22monetary management. This seems to be fairly straightforwardly within the scope of Schubert's proposition that infrastructure investment for SWFs would not be politically unsavoury either at home or abroad as it would benefit all parties, and particularly the citizenry (i.e. SWF's shareholders). In the same vein, SWFs have been an element in some countries being able to shield themselves from contagion during the financial crisis by maintaining government expenditure despite falling resource revenues (Moody’s, GCC, 2009/06/10). Finally, further information can be gleaned from the timing of reports, which is not dependent on access to the reports themselves. Prior to 2009, Moody’s hardly mentioned SWFs. It is interesting that as the literature suggests that as they have become more intertwined with global finance in their supportive rôle, equally have they been legitimised as factors, generally positive, in the assessment of a country’s sovereign financial viability.
Synthetic Analysis
The results support strongly the economic developmental catalytic usefulness of an SWF. National upward mobility is common in the countries that suggest the correlation between funds and ratings upgrades. What they do not suggest, is that, for example,  an SWF could be dropped into the darkest of socio-economics mires and elicit an immediate improvement in socio-economic indicators. Libya is not rated by Moody's and the inception of an SWF in 2006 did not seem to provoke interest in offering one. The same goes for Iran, Algeria, Nigeria, East Timor, Mauritania and Palestine. Mongolia saw no change in their rather poor rating either. At the other end, France and Norway's excellent ratings did not change in any way which could be associated with their funds. Instead, SWFs seem to be established, and elicit the most positive ratings change in countries already improving their institutional infrastructures. This means there has already been improvements, a fund is established, and progress is accelerated by the granting of a better rating which in theory encapsulates a myriad of intangible institutional, governance, and market-based advantages. There are the advantages that can be made explicit which aid the developmental process, despite the fact that both starting a fund and a ratings upgrade are essentially nominal events. As examined earlier, these can include not only cheaper credit, but also more attention from FDI, deeper integration into global finance, and a pool of resources to use against currency speculation. While the goal of this paper has not been to establish the prerequisites required for the most effective use of an SWF, the findings suggest the existence of some. First and most obviously, 
Gillette - 23a country must have excess revenues or a positive balance of payments which it can invest. These are already signs of good financial standing. As Schubert (2011) puts it, there is an opportunity cost to having available funds and not investing to maximise returns. The returns must be balanced financially and otherwise. He highlights especially the financial opportunity cost to not investing in equities, although as pointed out, ratings agencies also look favourably upon development of infrastructure because of the proxy benefits to the general business environment in a country. This however necessarily presupposes the existence of the opportunity to invest cash, i.e. having discretionary revenue.Next, the country must have a government willing to invest in domestic development to make the most of a fund. This is because the duality of advantages accrues from growing revenues through foreign investment, but also through improving the home economy through cheaper credit by obtaining a higher rating but also through things like infrastructural development. As was found in reports, this is part and parcel of a positive outlook by ratings agencies, but also a key in making business easier at home. This will also contribute to increasing the legitimacy of the government at home and abroad in financial/developmental terms.Thirdly, the country must be recognised as having some viability in investment terms. Several countries were not rated by Fitch, Moody's or S&P. Algeria for example, started a fund in 2000, currently worth 56.7Bn. Unfortunately however it cannot accrue gains from increases in a rating it does not have. The same factors that have not attracted the primary ratings agencies to Algeria then, likely would dissuade other investors.
Recalling Pukthuanthong-Le et al. (2007), the introduction of “tradable information” to the market by ratings agencies means that if, as has been shown to be the case, ratings change positively in accordance SWF establishment, that there is a novel element in investment behaviour added by the creation of a fund, purely in terms of potential investor attention. That said, the paper further points out that a positive change in a rating does not have as strong an impact as a negative one, reinforcing the finding that the downwards trend of Italy and Venezuela would have more than nullified any reassurance an SWF could have provided.These countries necessarily exhibited degrading economic conditions. What both ratings reports, and third party rating analysis (Afonso et al.) indicate however, is that ratings movements are related to a mixture of intangible measurable (GDP-related for example) and more fluid but equally important concepts such as governance. Both of these are implicated in SWFs, often with direct impacts, as has been suggested by Moody's in, for example, the case of Papua New Guinea, and as a general association (Aizenman & Glick, 2009).
Gillette - 24What this does suggest however is that the event in an of itself of establishing a fund is not a vastly important event. It is when they are more deeply integrated into a developmental trend that they have the most impact, and the ratings seem to agree. Take for example the two outliers, Italy and Venezuela. In the eyes of finance, both  these countries were clearly on strong downward trajectories at the time of their fund creation, strong enough that no fund could reverse them, just as funds do not seem a solution to static developmental inertia either. This s important though because as el Namaki highlights, ratings agencies reveal information directly, and also in a highly condensed format, which has serious impacts on how markets react. 
Finally these developmental indicators must be contextualised within shifts in the nature of economic globalisation and international finance. Ratings agencies are notorious for a lack of insight into when collapses occur.  That said, they should in theory be different from investors in that they should be more apt to distinguish between insolvency and illiquidity (Datz, 2004). the so-called “Globalisation trap” which is worsened by the fact that companies headquartered in a country cannot (generally speaking) be rated higher than that sovereign state's rating (Economist, 1993). If a country pursues a higher rating this is therefore beneficial not only in terms of gaining better standing within international finance but giving more room to local corporations to do the same for themselves. Given that several authors have found it possible to predict credit ratings using either fundamental indicators, or institutional assessments, the present findings should be expected. Both of these have been shown to improve before and after SWF inception in upwardly mobile developing countries – a novel, and functional use of sovereign surpluses, and a novel overall result.
Conclusions & Implications –   A neo-Gerschenkronian solution 
“A good deal of our thinking about industrialization of backward countries is dominated – consciously or unconsciously – by the grand Marxian generalization according to which it is the history of advanced or established industrial countries which traces out the road of development for the more backward countries”
(Alexander Gerschenkron, 1962, p. 6)
Gillette - 25Substitution, through state-sponsorship of banking, and the injection of capital into key industrial sectors was one of the possible solutions that Gerschenkron went on to highlight as a for the condition of backwardness. Each new industrialiser though would innovate on the fomula of previous industrialisers, based on the specific economic inputs or labour, capital, and industry found in that country. Sovereign wealth funds thus far are proving to be yet a new innovation on state-led development. Not only are they able to direct capital in the form of loans domestically, but they are also able to mitigate the innertive impacts of international finance on those countries, and proactively encourage foreign capital to enter. Gerschenkron's industrialisers were all on the cusp of breaking through when those governments (France, Prussia, Russia) took action to give a boost to the process. In the same vein, SWFs can be a phenomenally effective tool to achieve the same ends – take a country from an upward position, and push them to international prominence. In the process, the Marxian flows of capital are reversed, and LDCs can, through 'uphill' investment make themselves an important factor in foreign markets.
Reassurance and legitimacy are core concepts of the present analysis of how this is achieved. In securing and growing sovereign wealth much faster than would be possible by traditional wealth management at the national level, SWFs combine impactful domestic and south-south investment, which improves the local investment climate, with incentivised improvements to governance in the nation's government and local business environment. Legitimacy is therefore built up domestically as money is attracted from other non-governmental sources, and because of tangible improvements in domestic economic growth.Internationally, legitimacy is built by the establishment of a track record of “playing by the rules” of other markets. Mostly that means not taking overly aggresive positions and not acting on non-financial political motivations. No SWF country thus far has made hints that they are interested in financial conflict. The international community has responded by accepting the dominant Santiago Principles self-regulatory infrastructure for SWFs, while SWFs are accepting of the rules of local invesment where they find themselves, such as submitting to review of their purchases and government intervention in cases where domestic interests would in the eyes of the local government be compromised. They do not always choose to veto such moves though. While not an SWF per se, the CNOOC (Chinese national oil company) can be seen similarly in terms of how its investment would be portrayed in the west. It was last week approved by the Canadian government for a full takeover of the Canadian firm Nexen. The government of Canada said that while this will not be a carte blanche for foreign purchases of domestic oil firms, Nexen shareholders had approved the deal, and from the government's perspective, Nexen represented only a small stake in domestic oil production, as its holdings were mostly abroad (Chuyen Yee & 
Gillette - 26Jones). Therefore the deal was deemed acceptable. To boot, the CNOOC paid 61% more than Nexen's stock price for the shares. This is the progress made sice in 2005 the CNOOC's bid was rejected by the US government for American oil firm Unocal.
As SWFs and similar foreign investment vehicles become increasingly accepted in international finance, they are opening doors for LDC governments to be able to harness markets for maximised developmental results. Credit ratings are an important proxy inidicator of this process. As governments become better candidates for investment, and more likely to repay debts, investors are more willing to bring in money. The strong correlation between SWFs and improved ratings shows that they are a decisive market-convincing force. Reports suggest furthermore that for other reasons existing to infrastructure to invroments in organisational and managerial culture, that SWFs are bringing domestic markets to the internatinal stage, ready for flows from investors seeking dividends there.
The hesistant tone of analysis is also now favouring more room for SWFs in finance, and shining more light on why they will ultimately be good for development, and therefore good for investors as well. As nationalist rhetoric takes a back seat to the needs of the SWF countries and flow-recipient countries, both sides stand to gain from the stability of the SWF investment style, and the sums behind that philosophy. Precisely because they do not seek the highest possible returns, as hedge funds, for example, might, their cash stabilised OECD stock markets during and after the 2008 crash. Because of the mutual dependence of currencies, they simply cannot entertain pump-and-dump schemes to bankrupt foreign governments the same way traditional investors could when investing in South East Asia in the 90s, and other emerging market bubbles. In a story of historical irony, the disservice is not being returned, although SWF countries learned from the mistakes of leaving their economies vulnerable. SWFs provide shielding against such events happening again – encouraging for domestic businesses and foreigners looking to bring money there.
Sovereign wealth funds were introduced to the world in 1953, and to the English vernacular in 2005. Since, they have carved out an important place in international finance. Perhaps more importantly though, they have proven themselves effective tools for building an economy in a developing country. They've done this by giving greater access to credit to domestic businesses, upgrading countries' ratings, improving governance, building infrastructure and proving to be one of the most effective management vehicles for budgetary surplus and national ressource wealth. In the modern age, there stands a strong case for SWFs as a neo-
Gillette - 27Gerschenkronian tool for economic catching-up. If they continue to be as effective as they have been, and global finance continues to treat them as accepted participants in the market, the nature of international finance will be different, and the history of a divergence between liberal finance and chronic backwardness could begin to be rewritten. As catalytic tools for building economies in developing countries, sovereign wealth funds can help markets fulfill their rôle in allocating capital, help developing country governments fulfill their mandate, and help businesses and economies in both industrial and industrialising economies thrive.
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Annex A – Unobtainable Moody's reports (non-exhaustive)
Azerbaijan 2011/06/01Bahrain (lack of one with offshore financial assets is hurting) 2011/05/26Gulf countries generally 2011/03/23Bahrain placed on downgrade watch - lack of fund = factor 2011/02/23Kazakhstan 2011/01/11Botswana 2010/06/10Abu Dhabi - 2012/08/08Panama, advantages of SWF undermined by other factors - 2012/06/11Suriname - 2012/05/24Azerbaijan - 2012/09/14Thailand - 2011/11/22Norway - stability in part due to SWF - 2012/05/10Suriname - continued prudent fiscal mgmt incl. SWF - 2012/09/26Qatar - 2012/04/12Azerbaijan - 2011/06/01Gulf countries - 2011/03/23South Africa - better alternative to mine nationalisation – 2012/02/13
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Annex B – Data on sovereign wealth fund inception and sovereign credit rating changes
Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
Moody's Fitch
Year/Mont
h
Change Year/Mont
h
Change
Norway Governme
nt Pension 
Fund – 
Global
$656.2 1990 Aaa Since 
1997
AAA
China SAFE 
Investment 
Company
$567.9 1997 1998/02 Outlook 
Negative
1998/09 Review for 
downgrade
1998/12 Rating 
confirmed
2000/09 Raiting 
raised 
Baa2 - 
Baa1
China China 
Investment 
Corporatio
$482 9/27/2007 2007/05 Review for 
Upgrade
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Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
n
2007/07 Rating 
raised A2 - 
A1
2007/07 Local 
Currency 
rating 
assigned: 
A1
China – 
Hong 
Kong
Hong 
Kong 
Monetary 
Authority 
Investment 
Portfolio
$293.3 1993 No change 
3 years 
either side
8/10/1994 Assigned 
AA- rating
Russia National 
Welfare 
Fund
$149.7 1/30/2008 2008/03 Review for 
Upgrade
2008/07 Rating 
raised 
Baa2 - 
Baa1
2008/07 Outlook 
changed to 
positive
2008/12 Stability 
confirmed
China National 
Social 
Security 
Fund
$134.5 8/1/2000 2000/09 Rating 
raised 
(Bank 
deposit) 
Baa2 - 
Baa1
Qatar Qatar 
Investment 
Authority
$115 2005 2005/05 Raised A3 
- A1 (2 
notches)
2006/05 Raised 
(Forex 
bond) A1 - 
Aa2 (2 
notches)
Australia Australian $78.2 2006 Aaa since 
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Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
Future 
Fund
2002
UAE – 
Dubai
Investment 
Corporatio
n of Dubai
$70 2006/05 2006/05 (UAE) 
Rating 
raised 
(forex 
bond) A1 - 
Aa2 (2 
Notches)
2006/09 Review for 
upgrade
2006/10 Rating 
raised 
(Bank 
deposit + 
forex gov't 
bond) A1 - 
Aa3
2007/07 Rating 
raised 
(same) 
Aa3 - Aa2
Libya Libyan 
Investment 
Authority
$65 2006 No Rating No ratings 
changes 3 
years out
Kazakhsta
n
Kazakhsta
n National 
Fund
$61.8 2000 2000/05 Outlook 
Changed 
to positive
2001/03 Review for 
upgrade
2001/06 Rating 
raised 
B1/B2 - 
Ba2/Ba3 
(2 notches)
2002/09 Rating 
raised 
Ba2/Ba3/B
a1 - 
Baa3/Ba1/
Baa1
Algeria Revenue $56.7 2000 not rated Not rated
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Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
Regulation 
Fund
UAE – 
Abu Dhabi
Mubadala 
Developm
ent 
Company
$53.1 2002 2004/12 
(next 
change)
(UAE) 
Rating 
raised A2 - 
A1
South 
Korea
Korea 
Investment 
Corporatio
n
$43 2005 2006/02 Outlook 
Changed 
to positive
2006/05 Rating 
raised 
(forex 
bond) A3 - 
A1 (2 
notches)
Iran National 
Developm
ent Fund 
of Iran
$40 2011 Not rated No 
changes 
within 3 
years 
either side
Malaysia Khazanah 
Nasional
$34 1993 1993/03 Rating 
raised A3 - 
A2
Azerbaijan State Oil 
Fund
$32.7 1999 No rating 
until 2006
7/3/2000 First rating 
assigned
9/21/2000 Outlook 
changed to 
positive
7/20/2001 Rating 
raised B+ - 
BB-
France Strategic 
Investment 
Fund
$28 2008 Aaa since 
1988/1992
Ireland National 
Pensions 
Reserve 
Fund
$17.5 2001 Aaa 3 
years 
either side
New 
Zealand
New 
Zealand 
$15.5 2003 Aaa since 
2002
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Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
Superannu
ation Fund
Chile Social and 
Economic 
Stabilizatio
n Fund
$14.7 3/6/2007 2008/11 Outlook 
changed to 
positive
2008/11 Review for 
upgrade
2009/03 Rating 
raised 
Aa3/A2 - 
Aa2/A1
Brazil Sovereign 
Fund of 
Brazil
$11.3 12/24/2008 2009/07 Review for 
upgrade
2009/09 Rating 
raised 
Baa3/Ba2/
Ba1 - 
Baa2/Baa3
/Baa3
2009/09 Outlook 
changed to 
positive
East Timor Timor-
Leste 
Petroleum 
Fund
$11.1 2005 Not rated Not rated
Bahrain Mumtalaka
t Holding 
Company
$9.1 2006/06 2006/05 Rating 
raised 
(forex 
long-term 
bond) 
Baa1-A2 
(2 notches)
2006/09 Review for 
upgrade
*Note, 
entire 
portfolio 
published 
on website
2006/10 Rating 
raised  
A2/Baa1 - 
A1/A3
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Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
2007/07 Rating 
raised 
A1/A3 - 
Aa3/A2
Peru Fiscal 
Stabilizatio
n Fund
$7.1 1999 1999/07 Rating 
assigned 
(forex 
gov't bond) 
Ba3
2000/09 Rating 
lowered 
Ba3 - B1
2000/10 Rating 
raised B1 - 
Ba3
2000/12 Outlook 
changed to 
negative
Botswana Pula Fund $6.9 1994 Rating not 
assigned 
until 2001
Not rated
Mexico Oil 
Revenues 
Stabilizatio
n Fund of 
Mexico
$6 2000 2000/02 Review for 
upgrade
2000/03 Rating 
raised 
Ba1/Baa2/
Ba3 - 
Baa3/Ba1/
Baa1
2001/09 Outlook 
changed to 
positive
2002/02 Rating 
raised 
Baa3/Ba1 - 
Baa2
Chile Pension 
Reserve 
Fund
$5.7 12/26/2006 2006/03 Review for 
upgrade
Gillette - 41
Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
2006/05 Rating 
raised 
(long-term 
forex 
bond) 
Baa1 - A2 
(2 notches)
2006/07 Rating 
raised 
(other 
categories) 
Baa1 - A2 
(2 notches)
Saudi 
Arabia
Public 
Investment 
Fund
$5.3 2008/07 2010/02 Rating 
raised A1 - 
Aa3
China China-
Africa 
Developm
ent Fund
$5 2007 2007/05 Review for 
Upgrade
2007/07 Rating 
raised A2 - 
A1
2007/07 Local 
Currency 
rating 
assigned: 
A1
Angola Fundo 
Soberano 
de Angola
$5 2012 
(Announce
d 2008)
2010/05 Rating 
Assigned 
2011/02 Review for 
Upgrade
2011/06 Rating 
raised 
Ba3/B2/B1 
- 
Ba1/B1/Ba
3
Trinidad & 
Tobago
Heritage 
and 
Stabilizatio
n Fund
$2.9 2000 2000/01 Review for 
Upgrade
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Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
2000/04 Rating 
raised 
Ba1/Ba2/B
aa3 - 
Baa3/Ba1/
Baa1
Italy Italian 
Strategic 
Fund
$1.4 2011 2011/06 Review for 
downgrade
2011/10 Rating 
lowered 
Aa2 - A2
UAE – Ras 
Al 
Khaimah
RAK 
Investment 
Authority
$1.2 2005 2006/05 (UAE) 
Rating 
raised 
(forex 
bond) A1 - 
Aa2 (2 
Notches)
2006/09 Review for 
upgrade
2006/10 Rating 
raised 
(Bank 
deposit + 
forex gov't 
bond) A1 - 
Aa3
2007/07 Rating 
raised 
(same) 
Aa3 - Aa2
Nigeria Nigerian 
Sovereign 
Investment 
Authority
$1 2011 Not rated In 2011 
Fitch's 
outlook 
changed 
from 
'negative' 
to 'stable'
Palestine Palestine 
Investment 
Fund
$0.8 2003 not rated not rate
Venezuela FEM $0.8 1998 1998/02 Outlook 
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Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
changed to 
negative
1998/02 Review for 
downgrade
1998/07 Rating 
lowered 
Ba2/Ba3 - 
B1/B2
1998/09 Rating 
lowered 
B1/B2/B3 
- 
B2/Caa1/C
aa1
US – 
North 
Dakota
North 
Dakota 
Legacy 
Fund
$0.5 2011 Insignifica
nt...it's 
North 
Dakota
Vietnam State 
Capital 
Investment 
Corporatio
n
$0.5 2006/08 
(announce
d in 2005)
2006/03 Rating 
Raised 
Ba3 - Ba2
Gabon Gabon 
Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund
$0.4 1998 Not rated Not rated 
until 2007
Indonesia Governme
nt 
Investment 
Unit
$0.3 2006 2006/02 Review for 
upgrade
2006/02 Rating 
raised 
(Forex 
bond and 
others) 
B2/B3 - 
B1/B2
2006/02 Rating 
raised 
(Forex 
bond) B1 - 
Ba3
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Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
2007/02 Outlook 
changed to 
positive
2007/08 Review for 
upgrade
2007/09 Rating 
raised 
Ba3/B2/B1 
- 
Ba2/B1/Ba
3
Mauritania National 
Fund for 
Hydrocarb
on 
Reserves
$0.3 2006 Not rated Not rated
Equatorial 
Guinea
Fund for 
Future 
Generation
s
$0.08 2002 Not rated Not rated
UAE – 
Federal
Emirates 
Investment 
Authority
n/a 2007 2007/07 Rating 
raised 
(Bank 
deposit + 
forex gov't 
bond) Aa3 
- Aa2
Oman Oman 
Investment 
Fund
n/a 2006 2006/05 Rating 
raised 
Baa1 - A2 
(2 notches)
2006/09 Review for 
upgrade
2006/10 Rating 
raised 
A2/Baa1 - 
A1/A3
2007/07 Rating 
raised 
A1/A3 - 
Aa3/A2
UAE – Abu Dhabi n/a 2007 2007/07 Rating 
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Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
Abu Dhabi Investment 
Council
raised 
(Bank 
deposit + 
forex gov't 
bond) Aa3 
- Aa2
Papua 
New 
Guinea
Papua 
New 
Guinea 
Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund
n/a 2011 Not 
changed 
since 2006
Not 
changed 
since 2008
Mongolia Fiscal 
Stability 
Fund
n/a 2011 Not 
changed 
since 2006
2010/11 Rating 
raised B - 
B+
*Data 
from: 
http://www
.swfinstitut
e.org/fund-
rankings/
Data from 
Moody's 
and Fitch 
Historical
Summary:
65 SWFs
Impact: 28 time the 
rating was 
raised at 
least once 
in the three 
years 
following 
the 
inception 
of an SWF
Twice the 
rating was 
lowered 
and both 
have 
strong 
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Country Sovereign 
Wealth 
Fund 
Name
Assets 
$Billion
Inception Credit 
changes
mitigating 
circumstan
ces
The rest 
are either 
not rated 
(most) or 
saw no 
change
Of those 
rated and 
which saw 
change, 
there is a 
93% 
positive 
change 
rate
(many of 
these were 
raised 
multiple 
times in 
the wake 
of an 
announcen
ement of 
fund 
inception)
